The accepted practice of combining observations rests upon the hypothesis that the frequency of errors follows a certain well-known law which may be expressed as follows: Let A be the amount by which the result of an observation may differ from the value obtained by taking the mean result of anl infinity of simlilar observations. A will then be the error of the observ-ation. The infinitesimal probability that an error will be contained between the limits A and t+dA is supposed to'be given by the equatio-n cip = eh2 2dA, in which ht is the "modulus of precision" depending upon the accuracy of the observations, and e is the Naperiani base. The modulus h is commnonly replaced by a probable error r, which tern signifies such a magnitude that the number of errors less than r in absolute value is equal to thie number which exceed r. The value of r is given in terms of the modulus h by the equation
4-i h
When the errors really follow the law in question, they diminish with extielne rapidity as A increases. For examnple, only one per cent. of the errors should fall without the limits i 4r.
As a mnatter of fact, however, the cases are quite exceptional in which the errors are found to really follow the law. The general rule is that much more than one per cent. of the errors exceed four times the probable error. In other 344 NEWCOMB: A Geeneralized Theory of the Combination of words, it is nearly always found that some of the outstanding errors seem abnormally large. The method of dealing with these abnormal errors has always been one of the most difficult questions in the treatmeint of observations. The common practice has been to consider the observations affected by them as ablnormal, and to reject them in obtaining the finial result. But we here meet with the difficulty that no positive criterion for determining whether an observation should or should not be treated as abnormal is possible. Several attempts have indeed been made to formulate such a criterion, the best known of which is that of Peirce.* Peirce's criterion has always seemed to me subject to two serious objections. One is that it takes no account of aniy probable error of the observations under consideration which may be known beforehand, but proceeds as if the value of the probable error could be deduced from the comparison of the observations inter se. An iminediate general consequence of this is that if all the errors of a system are multiplied by the same factor, the same observations are rejected as before, how small or great soever the factor may be.t
The second objection is that it takes no account of the fact that the a -priori probability that an observer shoul(d make an abnormal observation varies with the observer, and places all observers on a level by regarding that probability as determined by a general mathematical principle applicable to all cases.
It is, however, well known that some observers make very few abnormal observations, while others are extrenmely liable to them. It is evident that if we are dealing with an observation whose error is so large that we doubt whether it should or should not be considered abniormal, our judgment must depend very largely upon any knowledge we may have of the carefulness of the observer.
The fact is, however, that any systemn of rejecting supposed abnormal observations is subject to the objection of leading to a result which is a discontinuous function of the separate errors of observation, and hence to results * Gould's Astronomical Journal, Vol. II, p. 161. t Certain results of Peirce's criterion in special cases, When applied to sets of three or four observations, do not seem to have been hitherto noticed. The following are cases in point:
Of a set of three observations none are ever rejected by it, no matter how much one may deviate from the mean of the other two.
In a set of four observations, if three agree exactly, the fourth will always be rejected if it differs ever so little from the others. More generally, if no one of the three results which agree best among themselves differs from the mean of the three by more than e, then a fourth, which differs from that mean by more than 4c, will be rejected. For example, if the results of four observations with a meridian circle were 0". 3; O". 4; 0". 5; 0". 8, the last would be rejected. which are sometimes indeterminate. Suppose, for example, that we are dealing with the mean of three observations, two of which are closely accordant, while the third differs from the mean of the other two by the quantity x. Let us represent the mean of the two accordailt ones by the syinbol in'; then, if we include the discordant observation, the general expression for the mnean result in terms of x will be m-m'+ 3X.
In ordinary astronomical practice we retain this value of m so long as x does not exceed the limit which we consider that of a normal error. But, as soon as this limit is reached, we drop x entirely and take m' for the value of m. In other words, if we consider x to increase from zero, the adopted value of m will increase one-third as fast until the assigned limit is reached, and will then suddenly spring back from in' + Xx to in'. If the critical point at wlhich x is to be rejected could be satisfactorily defined, this course would be less objectionable. But, as a matter of fact, it is to be determined by the judgment of tlle investigator, with the result that between certain wide limits the investigator must hiynself be doubtful whether he should take m' or m' + I x as his result. Of course different investigators would reach different conclusions in special cases, and thus the most probable result is frequently indeterminate.
There are classes of important observations in which the proportion of large errors is so great that no separation into normal and abnormal observations is possible. This is the case in observations of transits of Venus and Mercury over the sull. A noteworthy instanice has been given by the writer in his discussion of transits of Mercury.* By a comparison of 684 observations it was found that the errors of one-half of them were contained between the limits ?t 6".8. If the errors followed the commonly assumed law, then only 5 of them should have exceeded 4+ 27 seconds. As a matter of fact, however, it was found that 49 exceeded these limits. Yet these 49 observations cannot be considered as wholly worthless, because their results are not scattered entirely at random, and are mostly included between comparatively narrow limits. They differ from the other observations onily in having a larger probable error.
The case may be miade clearer by reflecting that the law in quiestion presupposes that the observations under consideration are all of the same general quality as regards liability to error; in other words, that they are all liable to VOL. VIII. * Astronomical Papers of the American Epheineris, Vol. I, pp. 379-383. the same errors, and differ only in the accidental circumstances which give rise to the errors. If, however, this is not true; if, for examnple, we are furnished with a system of observations of which one portion have a small probable error, another a larger probable error, a third a yet larger one, and so on, then the errors of the whole system will not follow the law in question, but we shall find that large errors are disproportionately frequent. Now, this must be the case in nearly all astronomical and physical work.
From this another conclusion follows. In such a mixed system of observations the most probable result will be, not the arithmetical mean, but a mean obtained by giving less weight to the more discordant observations. This will be evident on reflecting that in such a case the more discordant results will probably belong to the observations having a larger probable error and therefore *the less weight.
? 2. Modified Curves of Probability.
The preceding considerations lead us to the further conclusion that the comrnonly received theory which presupposes that there must always be somie oine "mDost probable value" of a quantity determined by observations, lacks generality. The fact is that, in special cases, owing to a possibility of abnormal observations, the curve of probability may have a great variety of forms. As one example, let it be supposed that two m-lean declinations of a star, determinied with a good. meridian circle the micrometer-head of which is numbered at intervals of 5", differ fromn each other by a quantity approximating to 5". We then mlay make three hypotheses: that the observationls are both normal, or that one or the other of them is in error by 5" through a mistake in recordinlg.
According to the probability of the first hypothesis, and of either of the other two, we-may have different curves. Assuminig the instrumelnt and observer to be so accurate that a difference of 5"-between two normxal observations is nearly out of the question, we shall have a curve of the form A. As the probability of the first hypothesis increases, the curve miiay assume the formn B. If the observer is one never known to make mistakes in reading, the curve will approximate to its usual form.
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Observations so as to Obtain the Best Result.
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Now, it is evident that in such a case as that indicated by curve A, we can assign lno one most probable value of the observed quantity. The only comliplete statement we could make would be embodied in a table showing for each separate possible value of the required quantity the probability that the quantity had a value not differing from it by more than a smiall arbitrary amount. Assumning the intervals of the table to be taken to equal double this amount, the sum of all these probabilities wouild be unity.
Looking further inlto the matter, we see that this is a general method. of expressing the conclusion to be derived in all cases from an observation or a series of observations. No matter how definite the primary value given by an observation may be, the actual conclusion to be drawn is always a series of separate probabilities that the quantity observed has some one of an infinite series of values. If the law of probability is that commonly assumed, then the probability of each assignable value is completely determined when the most probable value and the probable error are given. But such is not the caso when the law of probability deviates from this form. The question now arises whether, when we consider the most general case, in which there mnay be several maxima of probability, and when, therefore, no one most probable value can be assigned, it is possible to formiulate any general principle by which a single value shall be preferred for acceptance above all others. Taking as an example such a case as A just given, it is clear that no such principle is possible without some antecedent hypothesis determining a law of choice between errors of different magnitudes. If, to fix the i(deas, we suppose that in case A the results of the two separate observations were 0". 0 and 5". O, then the three hypotheses will give us 0". 0; 2". 5; 5". 0, as three values between which we are to choose. If we choose eitlher the first or third, we shall have a probability of slightly less than one-half of being very near the truth, and anl equal probability of being 5" in error, together with a very small probability of being about 2". 5 in error. If, on the other hand, we take 2". 5 as our result, we shall be almost sure of being between 2" and 3" in error,. and no miore. Our choice, then, mnust depend oni whether a certainty of being 2". 5 in error, or an even chance of each of the errors 0" and 5", is preferable. This again turns upon the question whether an error of 5" involves more or less than twice the evil of an error of 2". 5.
The ordinary requiremnents of practical life are in favor of the view that the evil increases in a higher ratio than the simple magnitude of the error. As examnples, if it is a case of ani error in the position of a ship arising from an error of the Nautical Almanac, we readily see that the probability of the error leading to a shipwreck increases in a-higher ratio thani that of the simple error itself. Again, in the case in which, b5y the labor of continually increasing observations of a single quantity, we lessen the probable error, we know that it requires fourfold labor to reduce the-probable error to one-half. It would seem, therefore, that the best hypothesis that we can adopt is that the evil of an error is proportional to the square of its mnagniitude.
A determination has more or less value accoirding as it is less or more liable to errors. The simplest definition of the value of an observation that we can adopt is that it is inversely as the sum total of the evils to which it is subjected, each evil being multiplied by its probability. This also is in strict accord with the ordinary law of probability of a number of observations, since it involves the hypothesis that the value of a result is proportional to the number of observations on which it depends. As. however, the word "value," if used to express this conception, would be ambiguous in consequence of being applied to the simple amnount of a quantity, we shall use the term worth to express the economic value of an assigned value as just described. We therefore have the definitions:
The evil of any value assigned to a quantity is equal to the sum of all the products obtained by multiplying the square of each possible error of that assigned value by the probability of its occurrence.* The worth of any such value is inversely proportioned to its evil. The value to which we are to give the preference is that whose worth is a maximum, or, which amounts to the same thing, whose evil is a minimum. This value, and the magnitude of the evil with which it is affected, will be two elements corresponding to " most probable value " and " probable error" in the usual theory. In what precedes, the form of our equations is based upon the supposition that x1, x2 .... x.,, are a finite inumber of discrete values which x may have. In the usual case, however, the unknown quantity may have all values between 35& NEWCOMB: A Generalized Theory of the Combination of certain wide limits, and the probability that it is contained between the limits x and x + dx is given by an equation of the form dp = qp(x)dx, dp being an infinitesimal probability. Since this is a pure numnber, it follows from this equation that, whatever physical quantity may be represented by x, q (x) must be of the dimnension -1 in this quantity.
Reducing the formula (1) to the present case, we find that the preferable value of x is given by the equation From the definition of evil, it is a quantity of the dimensions + 2 in those of the physical quantity in question. Its square root is therefore a definite quantity of the magnitude to be determined, which we may regard as an error.
An example of the results of the presenlt theory will be found by applying it to the case of the usually assumed law of error, namely:
We then have x0 = 0 as the preferable value of x, in accordance with the usual theory. In the expression for the evil of this value we have
This value of B is identical with the square of what is commonly called the mean error, which again is equal to 1. 5 x probable error nearly. Hence, in this special case, the evil is identical with the square of the meaii error. If, instead of taking zero as the value of x, we wish to express the evil of any other assumed value, we have the expression e= x2+ B=E2+ x2, s being the mean error. If, instead of e, we uise r, the probable error, the expression will be e=x2+ 2.198r2.
We readily find that if, instead of usilng the miost probable value of a quantity, we adopt a value differing from it by its probable error, the evil will be increased by a little less than half its whole amount. It appears, therefore, that, whatever the law of error, we mnay always find two quantities corresponding to " most probable value," and " probable error" of that value in the usual theory. One of these quantities will natuirally be the best value of the required magnitude, or A itself. The other may be either the evil of the value A, or the change in the value of the magnitude required to increase its evil in a definite ratio, these last quantities being functions of the same quantity, and therefore of each other. If we present the result in the form x A f VB-A2, the last term will be the " mean error" in the usual theory, and the change in x which would double its evil in the generalized theory. If we wish to express the quantity corresponding to the "probable error," we write If + (>) be mnultiplied by any constant factor, it will disappear from this expression; we may therefore disregard all such factors in forming +(K). We may therefore take for 4; (n) the product of the m quantities hfe7 h2 (Xj_ -0)2 + h2fe7h h. among the m separate observations. Since each observation may, independently of all the others, have any one of the n measures of precision, there will be nm such hypotheses, each leading to a different mean, w. The final value of x is again a mean by weights of the results of the different hypotheses, the weight of each result being proportional to the probability of the hypothesis on which it depends, which is represented by w. This probability is a product of two factors, of which one, PL, is proportional to the probability of the combination, while the other, ekC, is the probability of the combination of outstanding errors to which the hypothesis leads. Before showing how the preceding method may be simplified in practice, it may be of interest to give a simple numerical example of its rigorous application. Let it be granted that we have three observations of a class for which there is a probability of 2 that an observation is good, and of that it is poor. Let the measure of precision of a good observation be 4, and of a poor one 1. Let the results of the three observations be I, 0; II, 0; III, 1.
Since we have, a priori, no reason to distinguish between these results, the usual method of treatment would lead either to X as the best result, or to the rejection of the third observation, and hence to the result 0. From the point of view of the present paper, the agreement of the first two observations and the discordance of the third give color to the hypothesis that the first two observations are good and the third poor. On this hypothesis the best result would be -, the weights of the results being 16, 16 and 1. But, since every other hypothesis we can make would lead to a larger result, the best result must be greater than this.
The In order to apply the preceding method, it is necessary to know the respective probabilities that the measure of precision of any one observation has the several values hl, h2 .... hn. These probabilities are determined from the actual distribution of the residuals with respect to magnitude as found by the study of large masses of observations. If it were found that in any class of observations the magnitudes of the residuals followed the cornmonly assumed law, we should have but one value of h. If, as will commonly bje the, case, we find a larger number of large residuals than would be given by the common theory, we assume one, two, three or more additional values of h, and determine how many observations we must assign to each class in order that the distribution. may be represented by an equation of the form (5).
To carr.y out the rigorous process of finding the best mean value of x, we should form, by the equations (8) We have now to introduce another approximate hypothesis, namely, that the various values of k are so nearly equal that they may be regarded as having a common value. We note that k2 is the sum of the squares of the m h's, and that, in the large majority of cases, the sum will approximate to a certain mean value,-found by distributing the m values among the n classes proportionally to their several probabilities.
If we now substitute the preceding values of w and v in (12) we find, on the above hypothesis, that the value of x nmay be reduced to the form If, however, we have some knowledge of an observation which leads us to assign it one precision rather than another, we may utilize this knowledge so as to modify the values of wj(t. If h1, h2, etc., are takeni in the descending order of magnitude, then h1 will be the weight of each observation of the best class. The theoretically best mode of dealing with such cases will, however, depend upon the circumstances of that case. Simplicity is so important an advantage that it will probably be found well to adopt the rule of replacing W by its product by the weight fixed from a priori considerations.
? 9. Application to Transits of Mercury over the Sun's Disc. I now propose to apply the preceding theory to the case of observed contacts of the inferior planets, Mercury and Venus, with the lilnb of the Sun. A peculiarity of the observations of these phenomena is the great number of themn which investigators have had to reject on account of discordance of individual observations from the general mean. By suitable rejection very different final results mnay be obtained, and it is impossible to draw any line between those observations which should be rejected and those which should be retained.
In my discussion of observations of transits of Mercury,* I have shown that the residuals of 684 observations of the interior contact of the limbs of the Sun and Mercury are distributed as follows, the value of each residual being considered only to the nearest round 5 seconds: If we could be sure that any one observatioli belonged to the best class, its weight on the above scale would be 10; were we sure it belonged to the intermediate class, its weight would be 3, and if it belonged to the worst, class, it would be 0.77. The value of W for g = 0, namely, 6.1, falls below 10 in consequence of the probability that an observation of residual zero may belong to one of the poorer classes, and the value of W for an observation of residual VOL. VIII. 
The second term of the right-hand member of this equation is a certain mean among the various values of 2, and coincides with the square of the " mean error " of the usual theory, which, as already shown, coincides with the "evil," as that term is here defined. If there is but one distribution of the h's among the x's, then there will be but one value of n, and the first term of the evil will vanish, so that we shall have no evil left except the " mean error." But when, as here supposed, the weights of the observations are themselves uncertain, then the last equation expresses the logical conclusion that, in order to obtain the total evil, we must add to the result of. the mean uncertainty of the observations a quantity depending upon the uncertainty in the weights we should individually or collectively assign to them.
The first term of (15) Here the sign X of summation extends to all the T( 1) products of u having 2 the same constant suffixes i and j.
Although the value of this expression admits of rigorous algebraic determination, it is doubtful whether there would be any advantage in computing it in any special case. I shall therefore seek only for a rough approximation to its probable value. Returning to the equation ( is one-half a weighted mean value of (r -l)2, the weight of each being the product wiwj, and the zero terms (,n , )2 being allowed to enater with half weight in taking the mean. Instead of this weighted mean we may take the general mean formed by giving all the differences equal weight. Now, when the number of observations treated is large, we may consider the amount by which any one value of n differs from the mean of all the values, or x, to be the result of an accumulation of accidental errors; namely, if we put As already shown, this evil will be the square of the "mnean error" to be expected of the usual theory; so that we may take e V = E as the mean error to be expected. I remark, in conclusion, that this theory and method may be extended to the case of several unknown quantities without any other difficulty than that of a resolution of the equations of condition with the a posteriori weights. We should first solve the equations if necessary, using equal weights for all, or such system of weights as might be deemed most probable. From the residuals thus obtained we should deduce the law of error, and in practice we should, in order to determine such law, combine with the residuals in question all others that astronomy could furnish pertaining to the same class of observations. Then we should re-solve the equations using the modified weights, which re-solution would give us the definitive result.
